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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 26, 1990, Nancy Beth Cruzan died in the Missouri
Rehabilitation Center in Mt. Vernon, Missouri where she had spent
the last five years of her life in a persistent vegetative state.' Nancy's
death occurred twelve days after doctors, pursuant to a court order
obtained by Nancy's parents on December 14, 1990, removed the gas-
trostomy tube that provided Nancy with artificial nutrition and hy-
dration.2 The court order was the result of a three year battle fought
by the Cruzans in an effort to allow their daughter to die with dig-
nity and prevent her from becoming a victim of modern medical
technology.
Nancy Cruzan was just one of the estimated 10,000 Americans to-
day who are being kept alive by life support systems.3 With the in-
credible advances that have been made in modern medical
technology, doctors are able to keep patients alive through the use of
artificial resuscitators, intravenous feeding, and gastrostomy feeding
and hydration tubes that are implanted in a patient's stomach and
provide the patient with food and water.4 As a result of these ad-
vances, however, many patients are becoming "prisoner[s] of medical
technology,"5 forced to exist under conditions in which most people
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
The term "vegetative state" describes a "type of indefinite deep coma. Although the
eyes may be open and occasional random movements of the head and limbs may occur,
there are no other signs of consciousness and no response to stimuli. Only the basic
body functions, such as breathing, heart beat and body temperature, are maintained."
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1042 (1989).
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
3. Minow & Cate, The Lessons of Sidney Greenspan, Chi. Tribune, Oct. 17, 1990,
at C17.
4. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, Cruzan
v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
To insert a gastrostomy tube, a patient must undergo a surgical procedure in which
the surgeon makes an opening in the stomach. The tube is either inserted into the
stomach or passed through the small intestine. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 478 (1989).
5. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 423.
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would not want to live.6
Many doctors feel that they must exhaust every available resource
before they can allow a patient to die.7 However, other medical pro-
fessionals feel that there is an appropriate time for terminating ex-
traordinary medical treatment.8 These doctors argue that where a
patient has no possibility of recovering from her condition to lead a
normal life, the use of extraordinary measures to prolong life is an
abuse of the technology modern medicine has given us.9
Nancy Beth Cruzan was a victim of such abuse. In 1985, Nancy was
involved in a car accident that left her in a persistent vegetative
state. 10 Her body was in a deep coma and functioned solely on the
basis of its internal controls. Nancy's body was able to maintain its
circulation, temperature, and digestive functions. In addition, she re-
tained some reflex activity of nerves and muscles, allowing her to re-
act to low stimuli. However, Nancy remained unaware of her
surroundings."' A gastrostomy tube providing Nancy with food and
water was the only thing that kept her from dying.12
In June 1990, the United States Supreme Court upheld a decision
by the Missouri Supreme Court that Nancy's gastrostomy tube
should be removed.13 This Note will discuss the differing approaches
taken by state courts in addressing the "right-to-die" issue. In addi-
tion, the Note will analyze the Cruzan opinion and discuss the impact
that the Cruzan decision will have on the legal community, the medi-
cal community, and the individual patient.
6. There is much debate as to which situations require a doctor to administer ex-
traordinary treatment and which situations allow the doctor to withhold such treat-
ment. A terminally ill patient who has no chance of recovery, but who is forced to
remain on life support, can be said to live in a condition under which most people
would not want to live. In this scenario, the generally agreed upon procedure is that
the doctor can remove the treatment without breaching any duty owed to the patient.
Skegg, The Termination of Life-Support Measures and the Law of Murder, 41 MOD. L.
REV. 423, 425 (1978). This situation contrasts with the scenario in which a patient is
healthy, comparatively speaking, except that she is dependent on a respirator because
she is a victim of polio. In this situation, it is relatively clear that a doctor would
breach her duty of care to the patient if she removed the respirator. Id. at 424-45.
7. California Stories: Final Choices (PBS television broadcast, 1987) [hereinafter
Final Choices].
8. The American Medical Association, in its official guidelines for the withdrawal
of medical treatment, declares that extraordinary measures to prolong life may be
withdrawn when "there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent." Gi-
ancola, The Discontinuation of "Extraordinary" Medical Treatment from a Terminal
Patient: A Physician's Civil Liability in New York 1980 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 326, 333
(quoting A.M.A. News, Dec. 1973, at 15, col. 2).
9. Final Choices, supra note 7.
10. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 410-11.
11. Id. See also In Re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987).
12. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
13. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Sources of the Right to Withdraw from Medical Treatment
It is generally recognized today that a competent person has the
right to refuse medical treatment- under certain circumstances. 14
However, states differ as to the source of this right. Courts have
found the right to withdraw from medical treatment in the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and in the
common law doctrine of informed consent.15
1. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
The early cases addressing the right to withdraw from medical
treatment looked to the free exercise clause of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.' 6 Most of these cases involved Je-
hovah's Witnesses who, for religious reasons, wished to refuse blood
transfusions.17 They argued that because the first amendment guar-
anteed their right to practice religion, it also guaranteed their right
to refuse medical treatment. In support of this argument, they rea-
soned that reliance on prayer treatment rather than medical treat-
ment was an integral part of their religion's practices.'s
14. Id. at 2846-47.
15. Id. at 2847-52. The following decisions have dealt with the right to terminate
medical treatment: Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (where court looked
to due process clause of the federal constitution to allow for termination of treatment);
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (finding a
right to allow termination); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127,
482 A.2d 713 (1984) (finding a right to terminate treatment); In re Severns, 425 A.2d
156 (Del. 1980) (granting right to terminate treatment); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (favoring termination); In re Estate of
Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989) (favoring termination); In re L.H.R., 253
Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (favoring termination); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987) (where right to terminate treatment was granted); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (where
right to refuse treatment was found); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (al-
lowing removal of life support); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 992 (1976) (allowing termination of life support); Leach v. Akron Medical
Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980) (finding constitutional right in allowing
termination); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981) (allowing removal of medical support); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d
810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (allowing removal). But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (not allowing withdrawal of life support).
16. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847 n.2.
17. Id. See also Lyon, The Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an
Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (1990)
[hereinafter Lyon].
18. Id. See also Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F..Kennedy Memorial
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2. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Other cases identified a right to withdraw from medical treatment
in the right to privacy found in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.19 In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court de-
cided In re Quinlan,20 the first termination of treatment case. The
case involved a young woman, Karen Quinlan, who, for unclear rea-
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (denying that first amendment free
exercise clause includes a right to refuse treatment); United States v. George, 239 F.
Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc.
2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
The courts have found that the right to withdraw from medical treatment based on
religious belief is not absolute. See Heston, 58 N.J. at 577-79, 279 A.2d at 672-74. Reli-
gious beliefs are protected by the Constitution, but allowable conduct pursuant to
them is not absolute; thus, a hospital could give an unconscious patient, who is a Jeho-
vah's Witness, a blood transfusion, over the objection of her family, when it was re-
quired by the hospital's ethical standards. Id
In the case of parents who refuse medical treatment for their children based on reli-
gious belief, it is particularly true that the right to withdraw from medical treatment is
not absolute. In 1868, the British Parliament declared that parents who refused medi-
cal treatment for their children based on religious beliefs could be held criminally lia-
ble if the child later died as a result. Gathings, Wihen Rights Clask- The Conflict
Between a Parent's Right to Free Exercise of Religion Versus His Child's Right to Life,
19 CUMB. L. REv. 585, 590 (1989).
Similarly, early American cases took the position that if a child died as a result of
her parents denying her medical treatment based on their religious beliefs, the parents
could be held criminally liable for the child's death. See People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d
438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967), rev'd in part, Walker v. Superior Court, 47
Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989) (holding
that parents who treated their child with prayer instead of medical treatment were
criminally liable for the child's death).
Today, although most states have enacted statutes that exempt parents who practice
faith healing from child neglect liability, these statutes have fallen into disfavor. As a
result, many new child abuse regulations define child neglect to include the denial of
medical treatment, regardless of whether it was denied based on religious belief. Re-
cent cases upholding criminal convictions of parents for the death of their children due
to the denial of medical treatment include: Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (sustaining a reckless homicide conviction of parents who used prayer treatment
for their son instead of medical treatment); Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985) (affirming conviction of parents for reckless homicide when they used
prayer treatment, fasting and scripture reading to treat their child, while refusing
medical treatment for bacterial meningitis); and Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695
(Okla. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989) (upholding the second degree
murder conviction of parents for failure to provide their child with medical treatment
despite their good faith reliance on religious belief for treatment of their child).
19. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
20. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976). See NEW JERSEY SU-
PERIOR COURT, IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN (1975) (including legal briefs, court
proceedings, and the New Jersey Superior Court decision).
Other termination of treatment cases include: Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,
741 P.2d 674 (1987) (where right to refuse treatment was found); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d
368 (Fla. App. 1986); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (finding
limited right to terminate treatment); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987)
(holding that another may exercise right to terminate treatment); In re Peter, 108 N.J.
365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); Delio v. Westchester County. Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1,
516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1986) (allowing termination of treatment).
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sons, stopped breathing one night in the presence of some friends.21
She was taken to the hospital and resuscitated. However, she had
been without oxygen for at least two fifteen minute periods and had
suffered extreme brain damage.2 2 Her physicians diagnosed her as
being in a "persistent vegetative state."23 Because she had no possi-
bility of recovering, her parents sought to remove the resuscitator
that assisted her breathing.24 When the doctor and medical staff re-
fused to remove it, Karen's father sought a court order to compel the
hospital to disconnect the resuscitator. 25
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision
that had denied the Quinlans' request for an authorization to remove
the resuscitator. 26 In reaching its decision, the court found that
Karen's right to withdraw from medical treatment rested in her con-
stitutional right to privacy.2 7 Although the court acknowledged that
the Constitution does not expressly recognize a right to privacy,28 it
looked to the Griswold 29 decision which had found a right of privacy
in matters of contraception. The Griswold court determined that this
right existed in "the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights 'formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance.' "30 The New Jersey Supreme Court went
on to state that the right set out in Griswold was "broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions." 31
From that conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted
to determine whether Karen, under the circumstances of her case,
was able to exercise her privacy right to terminate medical treat-
ment.32 In its decision, the court outlined two major state interests
in termination of treatment cases. 33 According to the court, a state
21. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 20, 355 A.2d at 653.
22. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 654.
23. Id,
24. Id at 22-23, 355 A.2d at 655.
25. Id. at 18-19, 355 A.2d at 651.
26. Id. at 42-44, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
27. Id. at 32-35, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
28. Id, at 33-34, 355 A.2d at 663.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
31. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973)).
32. Id. at 32,'355 A.2d at 662.
33. Id at 33-34, 355 A.2d at 663.
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has an interest in preserving the "sanctity of human life," in addition
to an interest in defending a physician's right to use her "best judg-
ment" in administering treatment.3 4 The court then weighed these
interests against Karen's interest in terminating the treatment.3 5 Be-
cause Karen's chance of recovery was so 'remote, the court ruled that
as a patient's prognosis for recovery faded, the state's interest in pre-
serving life and protecting the physician's right to administer treat-
ment lessened.36 Thus, Karen's interest in exercising her privacy
right to refuse treatment dominated over the state's interests in con-
tinuing treatment:
We think that the state's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis
dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights over-
come the State interest. It is for that reason that we believe Karen's choice, if
she were competent to make it, would be vindicated by law. Her prognosis is
extremely poor, - she will never resume cognitive life. And the bodily inva-
sion is great, - she requires 24 hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, the
assistance of a respirator, a catheter and a feeding tube.3 7
Therefore, the court in Quinlan made four important conclusions
regarding a patient's right to privacy in termination of treatment
cases. 38 First, the right of privacy extends to the right of a patient to
refuse treatment in certain circumstances. Second, the court stated
that an incompetent patient should not have a lesser right of privacy,
and that this right should be exercised on the patient's behalf by a
guardian.3 9 Third, the court introduced a system whereby a hospital
would appoint an ethics committee to ensure that the wishes of a pa-
tient are respected and to safeguard that a family's request for termi-
nation of treatment was made in good faith.40 This would reduce the
threat of liability to physicians when carrying out a patient's request
to terminate treatment.41 Finally, the court maintained that the deci-
sion to terminate treatment would not necessarily be dependent upon
a court's ruling in every case.42 The court concluded that life support
could be withdrawn if the patient had no reasonable possibility of re-
covery and the family requesting the termination of medical treat-
ment consulted with the hospital ethics committee. 43
34. Id.
35. Id. at 33-35, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
36. Id. at 35, 355 A.2d at 664.
37. Id.
38. See Lyon, supra note 17, at 1377.
39. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 35, 355 A.2d at 663. See also Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (finding
that a severely retarded man with leukemia had the right to refuse chemotherapy and
that the right could be exercised on his behalf by a guardian).
40. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 669.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 44, 355 A.2d at 672.
43. Id.
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3. Common Law Doctrine of Informed Consent
Another line of cases has looked to the common law doctrine of in-
formed consent in an attempt to resolve situations involving the
withdrawal of medical treatment. 44 This doctrine recognizes the
right to be free from any bodily invasion or interference. 45 Justice
Cardozo set out this principal in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital 46 when he stated that "every human being of adult years
and sound mind has the right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages."47 This
doctrine requires a physician to disclose to the patient any material
risks involved in the proposed treatment, and to obtain the patient's
consent before the physician may perform treatment.48 In addition,
this doctrine implies "a right to informed refusal."49
In re Storar5o is a decision where a court examined the right to re-
fuse medical treatment under the common law doctrine of informed
consent. In Storar, the Court of Appeal of New York addressed the
case of Brother Fox, an eighty-three-year-old monk, who had become
44. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Conservatorship of
Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (using both right of privacy and in-
formed consent doctrine to support termination right); In re Estate of Longeway, 133
Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
45. Lyon, supra note 17, at 1385. See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741
P.2d 674 (1987).
46. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
47. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
48. Lyon, supra note 17, at 1386.
49. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985). See also Note, In-
formed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1648 (1974).
There are exceptions to the doctrine of informed consent. For example, in an emer-
gency situation where a patient's life is in danger, and a decision must be made imme-
diately, if the patient is unable to give her consent to treatment, the physician is
authorized to make the decision on the patient's behalf. However, if the patient's fam-
ily members or guardians are available, the physician should consult with them in
making the decision. Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and
Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, 1
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 182 (1982). See also Buchanan, Medical Pater-
nalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-Type
Cases, 5 LAW & MED. 97 (1979); Meisel, The "Expectations" to the Informed Consent
Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision Making,
1979 WIs. L. REV. 413.
50. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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comatose during a hernia operation.51 The court acknowledged Fox's
right to be withdrawn from a respirator because Fox had specifically
stated on a number of occasions that he had no desire to have his life
prolonged "by medical means if there was no hope of recovery." 52
The court concluded that since there was no state law prohibiting a
patient from refusing medical treatment and that a "patient's right to
determine the course of his own medical treatment [is] paramount to
what might otherwise be the doctor's obligation to provide needed
medical care," Brother Fox was entitled to withdraw from the
respirator.5 3
In contrast however, some courts that have specifically recognized
a common law right to refuse treatment have not allowed incompe-
tent patients to withdraw from treatment because such patients lack
the capacity to consent to the withdrawal.54 These cases have typi-
cally relied on three requirements that patients must fulfill before
they will be found to have consented to a doctor's termination of
treatment. Generally, these decisions have stated that in order to ex-
ercise informed consent, the patient must demonstrate: (1) "the ca-
pacity to reason and make judgments"; (2) a voluntary decision
"without coercion"; and (3) "a clear understanding of the risks and
benefits" of the treatment alternatives including non-treatment, and
the nature of the disease and its prognosis.55
B. Incompetent Patients: How the Courts Protect Their Right to
Refuse Treatment
Incompetent patients pose a difficult problem in treatment with-
drawal cases. They should not receive a lesser right of privacy or
control over their bodies than a competent patient, yet determining
their desires may be impossible since they are incapable of speaking
for themselves.56 Thus, courts impose a strict framework for deter-
mining what incompetent patients would decide with regard to treat-
ment termination if they could speak for themselves.
First, courts generally require that an incompetent patient be ter-
minally ill and irreversibly comatose or in a persistent vegetative
51. Id at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
52. Id at 379, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
53. Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
54. Id at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (holding that a severely re-
tarded man could not withdraw from blood transfusions because he was incompetent
to consent to the withdrawal).
55. 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (citing
Wanzer, Adelstein, Crawford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig, and
Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 955, 957 (1984)).
56. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 35, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
992 (1976).
1018
[Vol. 18: 1011, 1991] Cruzan v. Missouri Depratment of Health
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
state.57 Once the first requirement is met, courts will balance a pa-
tient's right to withdraw from medical treatment against the state's
interests in sustaining treatment.58 Factors that courts have consid-
ered in examining the state's interests include the importance of pre-
serving life and the prevention of suicide; the interests of the
patient's family, children, and other innocent third parties; and fi-
nally, the state's interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. 59
If the right of the incompetent patient to withdraw from medical
treatment outweighs the state's interest in continuing it, the courts
have generally employed one of two tests to determine whether the
request to terminate medical treatment should be granted.
1. The Subjective or Substituted Judgment Test
The first test that a court may employ is the subjective, or substi-
tuted judgment test.6 0 Under this test, courts appoint a surrogate or
guardian to protect the incompetent's right to choose a treatment.
The guardian must determine how the incompetent patient would
have decided, had she been competent, and execute this choice.61
Courts differ in the application of this test. Some courts will consider
only statements and written documents, such as living wills, that the
patient made before she became incompetent.62 Additionally, these
courts will also consider a durable power of attorney, a written docu-
ment in which the patient, when competent, indicates her wishes as
57. See In Re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 47, 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (1989). See
also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 671 (requiring there to be no reasonable possi-
bility that the patient will ever emerge from her comatose state to a "cognitive, sapient
state," but not requiring a terminal illness).
58. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 48, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
59. Id.
60. This test originated in the English case of Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep.
878 (1816).
For American cases that apply this test, see In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. 1980);
In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Guardianship of Barry,
445 So. 2d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558
N.E.2d 1194 (1990); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976); In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987).
61. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375, 384 (1988) [herein-
after Rhoden].
62. Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 737, 740 n.5
[hereinafter Gelfand]. A living will is a document whereby a patient, while competent,
expresses his or her wishes concerning medical treatment in the event he or she be-
comes incompetent.
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to medical treatment, and appoints a guardian to implement these
wishes.63 In the absence of specific statements or written documents
made before the patient became incompetent, these courts will ex-
amine the "context of the individual's entire prior mental life, includ-
ing his or her philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals,
values about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived and
attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death."64
This approach was followed in In re Jobes.65 In this case, Nancy
Jobes was involved in a car accident which killed her unborn fetus.
During the subsequent operation to remove the fetus, Mrs. Jobes suf-
fered oxygen and blood loss to the brain which resulted in irrepara-
ble brain damage.68 The family petitioned to have a nursing home
remove a life-sustaining food and hydration system from Mrs. Jobes.
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that clear and convincing
evidence existed which indicated that Mrs. Jobes would never re-
cover and that her condition constituted an irreversible vegetative
state.6 7 The court then examined evidence of Mrs. Jobes' intent to
exercise her right to withdraw from the nutrition and hydration
treatment that sustained her.68S A close friend of Mrs. Jobes testified
that Mrs. Jobes had "specifically stated that she would not want to be
kept alive on a respirator like a patient suffering from amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis whom [her friend] had described to her."69 In addi-
tion, the court considered other similar statements made by Mrs.
Jobes, along with testimony by her husband that "if his wife were
competent, she would 'definitely' choose to terminate her artificial
feeding that sustains her in her present condition." 70 Based on this
evidence, the court upheld the family's decision that it was in Mrs.
Jobes' best interests to remove the feeding tube.71 The court rea-
soned that, although Mrs. Jobes' prior statements did not constitute
clear and convincing evidence of her intent to withdraw from treat-
ment, they did represent trustworthy evidence of this intent.72 This
evidence, combined with the Jobes family's "intimate understanding
63. Final Choices, supra note 7.
64. In Re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 415, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987) (quoting Newman,
Treatment Refusals for the Critically l7k Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician
& the State, 3 N.Y. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 45, 46 (1985)). See also In re Estate of Green-
span, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990) (stating that determination of an incompetent
patient's intent should be based on a combination of the patient's own statements of
intent when competent along with knowledge of th, patient's value system).
65. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
66. Id. at 403, 529 A.2d at 439.
67. Id. at 411, 529 A.2d at 441.
68. Id. at 412, 529 A.2d at 442.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 427, 529 A.2d at 451.
72. Id. at 412-13, 529 A.2d at 443.
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of the patient's medical attitudes and, general world view," was
enough to justify removal of the treatment.7 3
Similarly, in Gray v. Romeo,74 the United States District Court of
Rhode Island applied an analogous approach in using the substituted
judgment test. The court needed to determine whether Marcia, a se-
verely brain damaged woman, would wish to exercise her right to
privacy and withdraw from the gastrostomy tube that provided her
with food and hydration.75 In deciding the case, the court considered
evidence presented by Marcia's family concerning conversations Mar-
cia had with her husband and sister-in-law.7 6 First, the court focused
on a conversation between Marcia and her sister-in-law in which
Marcia discussed the Karen Ann Quinlan case.77 Marcia was dis-
turbed by the fact that Karen had been fed artificially and stated that
if she were ever in an irreversibly comatose state, she would not
want to be kept alive with a respirator or a feeding tube.78 Second,
the court was impressed by the fact that Marcia's family was able to
predict Marcia's intent in a thoughtful and coherent way, with one
voice and with no apparent conflict of interest.79 Finally, the court
considered the appointed guardian's impressions of the family's as-
sessment of Marcia's desires.80 Based on this evidence, the court con-
cluded that the substituted judgment, as made by Marcia's family,
expressed Marcia's intent to withdraw from medical treatment.8 1
In contrast, other courts use a more stringent version of the substi-
tuted judgment or subjective test.82 Under this approach, the court
searches for a clear expression of the incompetent's intent to with-
draw from life sustaining medical treatment.8 3 If no clear and ex-
press intent is found, the court will not authorize the patient's
guardian to terminate treatment on behalf of the patient.8 4 Unlike
the approach used in Jobes and Gray, this analysis does not consider
73. Id. at 415, 529 A.2d at 445.
74. 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 587.
77. Id& at 588.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id,
81. Id. at 591.
82. See In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988);
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), qff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
83. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 529-30, 513 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
84. Id.
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the religious, moral or philosophical views of the patient.8 5
To justify the use of this strict approach, courts reason that "de-
spite its pitfalls, and inevitable uncertainties, the inquiry must always
be narrowed to the patient's expressed intent, with every effort made
to minimize the opportunity for error."8 6
2. The Objective or Best Interests Test
As an alternative to the substituted judgment test, some courts
have adopted the objective, or best interests test.8 7 This test has two
different approaches, depending upon the circumstances of the case.
The first approach is the "limited objective test," which is applicable
in situations where reliable information exists indicating that the in-
competent patient would have exercised her right to refuse treat-
ment.8 8 The evidentiary standard used does not necessarily require a
clear and convincing indicator of the patient's subjective intent.8 9 For
example, while evidence of an informally expressed reaction to an-
other's medical treatment would not be enough alone to show the pa-
tient's subjective intent to withdraw from treatment, it probably
would constitute trustworthy evidence sufficient to satisfy this prong
of the limited objective test.90
The second prong of the limited objective test requires courts to
examine whether there is clear evidence that "the burdens of the pa-
tient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of
that life." 91 Therefore, a patient who is suffering and expected to
continue to suffer for the remainder of her life can terminate life
support when the net burdens of prolonging her life using life sup-
port markedly outweigh any benefits, enjoyment or intellectual satis-
faction that the patient is likely to experience in the future. The
courts factor into this analysis the extent of pain that the patient will
suffer both with the life support and after the life support is
withdrawn.92
This test was applied in In re Conroy.93 In Conroy, a family sought
to have artificial feeding and hydration tubes removed from Mrs.
85. Id. at 529-31, 513 N.E.2d at 613-14, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
86. Id. at 530, 513 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
87. Rhoden, supra note 61, at 396. See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,
741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 383, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1988) (en banc); In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); Pollack, Life and Death Decisions:
Who Makes Them and By What Standards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 519-20 (1989).
88. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 366, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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Conroy, an elderly patient with serious physical and mental impair-
ments.94 In applying the limited objective test, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey concluded that the first prong of the test (that there be
trustworthy evidence of the patient's subjective intent to withdraw
from medical treatment) had been satisfied by testimony from Mrs.
Conroy's nephew that Mrs. Conroy feared and avoided doctors and
94. Id. The court in Conroy specifically addressed the unique problem of with-
drawing life support from incompetent nursing home patients. The court maintained
that in these cases, it is inappropriate to apply the decision-making process that In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976), proposed for deter-
mining when life support can be withdrawn from a comatose patient in a persistent
vegetative state. The decision-making process advocated by Quinlan required the pa-
tient's guardian, family and doctor, and the hospital's ethics committee to agree to ter-
minate the life support.
However, Conroy supported the court's rejection of this decision-making process in
the case of elderly nursing home patients by highlighting the differences between such
patients and younger, comatose hospital patients. First, the Conroy court recognized
the fact that nursing home patients are particularly vulnerable since they are usually
elderly and inflicted with severe mental and physical disabilities. Also, most nursing
home patients will die in nursing homes. Thus, it is more difficult to ensure that the
motivations of the person who requests that life support be removed from a patient are
in good faith and truly reflect the desires of the patient and how he or she would wish
the course of treatment to proceed. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375, 486 A.2d at 1237.
Second, because of their advanced age, many nursing home patients no longer have
parents, siblings or children who are still living. Thus, it is impossible for their fami-
lies to play a role in deciding the course of the patient's treatment. Id.
Third, nursing home patients are unlikely to have physicians who play active roles
in their lives. Most physicians visit nursing home patients infrequently and usually do
not know their patients well enough to be acquainted with their attitudes and desires
toward life-prolonging treatment. Id. at 375-76, 486 A.2d at 1237-38.
Fourth, most nursing homes do not have ethics committees. In fact, the Senate Re-
port on Aging has documented cases of inhumane treatment of patients by nursing
home personnel and unsafe conditions in the homes that constitute fire hazards. Id. at
376, 486 A.2d at 1237-38 (citing SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LONG TERM CARE OF THE SPE-
CIAL COMM. ON AGING, NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUB-
LIC POLICY, INTRODUCTORY REPORT, S. REP. No. 1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974)).
Finally, nursing homes are not faced with making decisions about the course of a
patient's medical care with the same sense of urgency and speed that hospitals must
use in their decision-making. This is because nursing homes deal with patients whose
conditions are gradually deteriorating. In this situation, decisions regarding treatment
"arise more gradually and are foreseeable longer in advance." Id. at 377, 486 A.2d at
1238.
For all of these reasons, the court in Conroy maintained that the Quinlan approach
to making the decision to remove a patient from life support could not be applied to a
case involving an elderly patient in a nursing home. The court insisted that because of
the "special vulnerability of mentally and physically impaired, elderly persons in nurs-
ing homes and the potential for abuse with unsupervised institutional decision-making
in such homes," Id. at 381, 486 A.2d at 1240, the court must appoint a guardian for the
patient who will make the decision using the subjective, limited objective or pure ob-
jective tests. This will ensure that the decision reflects as accurately as possible, the
desires of the patient. Id. at 374-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-40.
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hospitals and that all she wanted was to have her "bills paid and die
in [her] own house." 95
However, despite the fact that the court found the first prong of
the test satisfied, there was insufficient evidence to support the sec-
ond prong of the test, that the net burdens of prolonging Mrs. Con-
roy's life markedly outweighed the benefits of keeping her on life
support.96 The court reasoned that there was very little evidence
that Mrs. Conroy was suffering or was experiencing intolerable pain
while she remained on life support.97 However, her doctors agreed
that if the tube were removed, Mrs. Conroy would definitely experi-
ence great pain during the one week between the time they removed
the tube and the moment of her death.98
The second approach used by some courts in applying the objective
test is the "pure objective test."99 Some courts employ this test when
there is no trustworthy evidence to determine the incompetent pa-
tient's intent to exercise her right to withdraw from treatment. 00
Thus, the court will look to whether the burdens of a patient's life
clearly and markedly outweigh its benefits before it will authorize
doctors to withdraw medical treatment.' 0 ' This approach is used fre-
quently when an incompetent patient has never been competent, and
thus, has never expressed a desire to exercise any rights, much less a
right to withdraw from medical treatment.102
In re Storar103 is an example of a decision employing the pure ob-
jective approach. John Storar was severely retarded, and although
he was fifty-two years old at the time of the trial, he had a mental
age of about eighteen months.l0 4 The case was brought by the Net-
work Development Center where John resided in an effort to obtain
an authorization to continue administering the blood transfusions
needed to treat John's bladder cancer. John's mother had requested
that the doctors terminate the transfusions because they were disa-
95. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218. The court permitted Mrs. Conroy's
guardians to introduce evidence that Mrs. Conroy was a devout Roman Catholic and
that the priest of her church deemed that removal of her nasogastric tube would be
both ethical and moral. The court allowed the guardians to use this evidence, along
with evidence of Mrs. Conroy's fear of hospitals and doctors, to infer that, if compe-
tent, she would want the doctors to remove the nasogastric tube and allow her to die.
Id. See also In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990) (admitting
testimony of rabbi in deciding whether patient should be removed from artificial nutri-
tion and hydration).
96. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 386, 486 A.2d at 1243.
97. Id.
98. Id
99. Rhoden, supra note 61, at 396.
100. Id. at 396-98.
101. Id. at 396.
102. Id. at 396-98.
103. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
104. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
1024
[Vol. 18: 1011, 1991] Cruzan v. Missouri Depratment of Health
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
greeable to John and because John became disturbed at the sight of
blood clots that appeared in his urine immediately following each
transfusion. 0 5
In determining whether the transfusions should be terminated, the
New York Court of Appeals employed the pure objective test since
John had always been incompetent to understand or make a decision
regarding medical treatment.106 Thus, the court believed that it was
inappropriate to attempt to determine whether John, in the event
that he were competent, would want to continue the life-prolonging
treatment.1 07 Therefore, the court considered the choice with which
John was faced based on an objective, reasonable person standard,
and concluded that the transfusions should continue. 08 The court
found that the transfusions were like food, in that although they
would not cure John's cancer, they would prevent him from dying as
a result of other treatable causes. The transfusions allowed him to
remain alert and function as normally as his retarded condition
would allow. Thus, as long as John received the transfusions, he
would be able to live his life almost as he had before he contracted
cancer. Still, he was forced to continue living with a fatal disease
that would inevitably "claim his life." 0 9
C. The Problem of Terminating Nutrition and
Hydration Treatment
In making a decision to withdraw any life-sustaining treatment, the
legal and medical communities, as well as patients' families, are
forced to grapple with many difficult religious, medical and legal is-
sues. However, the issue of terminating treatment which provides a
patient with food and water poses an even greater problem, for food
and water symbolize the most basic requirements of life. Feeding
those who cannot feed themselves* represents "the most fundamental
of all human relationships."11 Furthermore, death by dehydration
and starvation can be a very painful and unpleasant experience for a
patient.'1 ' However, it is generally recognized that a patient who is
105. Id. at 375, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
106. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
110. In Re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 39, 549 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1989) (grant-
ing the request of an incompetent patient's guardian to remove a gastrostomy tube
from the patient).
111. Death by dehydration can be extremely painful and unpleasant to a patient.
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comatose or in a persistent vegetative state is incapable of feeling the
pain associated with a death resulting from lack of nutrition and hy-
dration.112 Furthermore, the American Medical Association recog-
nizes that "life-prolonging medical treatment includes medication
and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or
hydration."1n3 Thus, state courts (with the exception of Missourin 4
and one New York court decisionli5) that have addressed the prob-
lem of withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration have treated it
as being analogous to any other form of life-sustaining treatment," 6
and have allowed its withdrawal in appropriate circumstances."i 7
III. THE CRUZAN CASE
On June 25, 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.118 This decision
marked the first time that the Court directly addressed the issue of a
The mouth, tongue, lips and nose dry out and crack. In addition, the patient's skin be-
comes dry and scaly. The eyes roll back into the patient's head, and her stomach dries
out, causing her to vomit. Her urine becomes extremely concentrated and burns the
bladder, and the patient experiences convulsions when her brain cells begin to dry out.
Finally, the patient will die when her respiratory system dries out, causing a thick se-
cretion to block her lungs. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 444 n.2,
497 N.E.2d 626, 641 n.2 (1968) (Lynch, J., dissenting in part) (where patient's doctor
testified that death by dehydration was "cruel and violent").
112. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 41, 549 N.E.2d at 295 (citing AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
NEUROLOGY, POSITION OF THE AMERICAN ACACEMY OF NEUROLOGY ON CERTAIN AS-
PECTS OF THE CARE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PERSISTENTLY VEGETATIVE STATE PA-
TIENT (adopted Apr. 21, 1988)).
113. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 41, 549 N.E.2d at 296 (citing American Medical Associ-
ation Council on Ethics & Judicial Affairs, Opinion 2.18 (1986)).
114. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990).
115. See In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
116. Courts have found artificial means of providing food and water, including in-
travenous infusions, gastrostomy tubes and nasogastric tubes, to be medical, life sus-
taining treatments. However, they have not found spoon and bottle feeding to be such,
and thus, have not allowed these feeding methods to be withdrawn. The reasoning for
this distinction rests on the belief that gastrostomy tubes, intravenous infusions and
nasogastric tubes are highly intrusive to the patient. Thus, their termination "does not
deprive the patient of life; rather the inability of the patient to chew or swallow, as a
result of his illness, is viewed as the ultimate agent of death." Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at
42, 549 N.E.2d at 296.
117. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154
Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.
3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Corbett v. D'Allesandro, 487 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990); In re Estate
of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 66 (1986); In re
Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434
(1987); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (1986); In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d
1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987).
118. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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patient's right to die.119 In granting the writ of certiorari, the Court
agreed to decide whether the United States Constitution allows a
state to impose a standard on termination of treatment cases,
whereby the family of an incompetent patient would have to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the patient, if competent, would
choose to withdraw from treatment.120 Further, the Court agreed to
resolve the question of whether a state is required by the Constitu-
tion to defer to the judgment of a patient's family when the patient is
incompetent to make his or her own medical decisions.121
A. Facts
On January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in a car ac-
cident in which her vehicle overturned.122 Police found her lying
face down in a ditch, having been thrown thirty-five feet from her
car.' 23 Police could detect no sign of a heart beat or breathing.
Paramedics arrived and managed to reinstate her cardiac and respira-
tory functions. They transported Nancy to the hospital where a doc-
tor diagnosed "a probable cerebral contusion compounded by
significant anoxia (deprivation of oxygen) of unknown duration."124
Nancy remained comatose for three weeks, after which time she
moved into an unconscious state.125 Although initially she was able
to take some food orally, in order to facilitate her feeding, doctors in-
serted a gastrostomy tube into her stomach. From that point on, she
received all nutrition and hydration through the tube.126
Nancy's doctors characterized Nancy as being in a persistent vege-
tative state.127 Her circulation and respiration continued as it would
in a normal thirty year old woman; however, Nancy was completely
unaware of her environment except to the extent that her reflexes
119. Id. at 2851. For a discussion addressing the problems of withdrawing nutrition
and hydration from handicapped newborns, see Frader, Forgoing Life Sustaining Food
& Water: Newborns in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE
SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER (J. Lynn ed. 1986).
120. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846, 2852.
121. Id. at 2846.
122. Id. at 2845.
123. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), off'd, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990).
124. Id. At trial, the court recognized that permanent brain damage occurs when
the brain has been deprived of oxygen for six minutes. In Nancy's case, doctors esti-
mated that she had been without oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes. Id.
125. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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"responded to sound and perhaps painful stimuli."128 She suffered
from anoxia of the brain, characterized by a massive enlargement of
the ventricles where cerebrospinal fluid fills the degenerated area of
the brain.129 Nancy's anoxia was a condition which was permanent,
irreversible and ongoing. Nancy was able to grimace in response to
sound or pain; however, this represented her highest cognitive brain
function. Further, doctors described Nancy as being a "spastic
quadriplegic," and her arms and legs were contracted with irrevers-
ible muscular and tendon damage.130 Finally, Nancy could not chew
or swallow enough food and water to meet her daily nutritional
needs, and her doctors maintained that she would never again be able
to meet those needs sufficiently.13 1 However, despite her condition,
Nancy's doctors concluded that Nancy was not dead132 or terminally
ill. In fact, if Nancy had remained on life support, she may have been
able to live another thirty years.133
When it became obvious that Nancy was never going to recover
from her condition to lead a normal life, her parents requested that
the gastrostomy tube providing her with food and water be removed,
so that Nancy would be allowed to die. Nancy's doctors refused to
comply with this request, and the Cruzans sought a declaratory judg-
ment to have the tube withdrawn.134
B. The Lower State Court Decisions
Once the Cruzans filed their motion, the trial court appointed a
guardian ad litem135 to represent Nancy's interests. The trial court
found that Nancy's liberty interests in withdrawing from the gastros-
128. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
129. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845 n.1.
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id
133. Id. Section 194.005 of the Missouri Public Health and Welfare Statutes
provides:
For all legal purposes, the occurrence of human death shall be determined
in accordance with the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
provided that death shall not be determined to have occurred unless the fol-
lowing minimal conditions have been met:
(1) When respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained, there
is an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation; or
(2) When respiration and circulation are artificially maintained, and there
is a total and irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the brain
stem and that such determination is made by a licensed physician.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (Vernon 1983).
134. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
135. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 410. A guardian ad litem is defined as "a special guard-
ian appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to represent an
infant, ward or unborn person in that particular litigation, and the status of the guard-
ian ad litem exists only in that specific litigation in which the appointment occurs."
BLACKs LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990).
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tomy tube outweighed any interests that the state had in the preser-
vation of life.136 The court then applied the substituted judgment
test and found that, based on statements Nancy made to a friend
when she was competent, it was clear that Nancy would not have
wanted to continue living in her present condition.137 Thus, the trial
court held that Nancy's parents could exercise, on Nancy's behalf,
her right to refuse medical treatment by requesting that the doctors
remove the gastrostomy tube from Nancy. 38 Finally, the trial court
stated that to the extent that Missouri statutes139 reflected the public
policy that artificial nutrition and hydration were not included in the
types of medical treatment from which a patient could withdraw,
136. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The trial court referred to sections 459.010(3) and 459.055 of Title XXXI of the
Missouri Trusts and Estates of Decedents and Persons Under Disability Statutes. Sec-
tion 459.010(3) provides as follows:
"Death Prolonging Procedure," Any medical procedure or intervention
which, when applied to a patient, would serve only to prolong artificially the
dying process and where, in the judgment of the attending physician pursuant
to the usual and customary medical standards, death will occur within a short
time whether or not such procedure or intervention is utilized. Death-pro-
longing procedure shall not include the administration of medication or the
performance of medical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort, care
or alleviate pain or the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition
nor hydration.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Section 459.055
provides:
Sections 459.010 to 459.055 shall be interpreted consistent with the
following:
(1) Each person has the primary right to request or refuse medical treat-
ment subject to the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties,
preventing homicide and suicide and preserving good ethical standards in the
medical profession.
(2) Nothing in sections 459.010 to 459.055 shall be interpreted to increase or
decrease the right of a patient to make decisions regarding use of medical pro-
cedures so long as the patient is able to do so, nor to impair or supersede any
right or responsibility that any person has to effect the withholding or with-
drawal of medical care in any lawful manner. In that respect, the provisions
of sections 459.010 to 459.055 are cumulative.
(3) Sections 459.010 to 459.055 shall create no presumption concerning the
intention of an individual who has not executed a declaration to consent to
the use or withholding of medical procedures.
(4) Communication regarding treatment decisions among patients, the fami-
lies and physicians is encouraged.
(5) Sections 459.010 to 459.055 do not condone, authorize or approve mercy
killing or euthanasia nor permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omis-
sion to shorten or end life.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.055 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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these statutes "violate[d] Nancy Cruzan's right to liberty, due process
of law and equal protection under the state and federal
constitutions."140
The State of Missouri and the guardian ad litem appealed the deci-
sion of the trial court.141 Although the guardian ad litem believed
.that it was in Nancy's best interests to have the gastrostomy tube
withdrawn, he felt that since this was a case of first impression, he
owed Nancy the duty as an attorney to take the case to the highest
state court.142
The Missouri Supreme Court, in a 4-3 vote, reversed the trial
court's decision and denied the Cruzans' request to have their daugh-
ter removed from the gastrostomy tube.143 In reaching its holding,
the court refused to acknowledge the existence of a right of privacy
under either the state or federal constitutions. 4 4 Instead, the court
looked to the common law right to refuse treatment as a basis for al-
lowing doctors to withdraw the gastrostomy tube from Nancy.145
However, the court expressly stated that this common law right was
not absolute and must be balanced against a very strong state interest
in the preservation of life. 1 4 6
In determining whether Nancy's right to withdraw from the treat-
ment outweighed the state's interest in the preservation of life, the
court examined various aspects of Nancy's condition. First, the court
recognized that Nancy was not terminally ill and could potentially
live another thirty years.147 Second, the court maintained that the
gastrostomy tube was not excessively invasive of her body since doc-
tors had testified that, due to her brain damage, Nancy would feel no
pain if it were removed and she were allowed to starve to death.148
Therefore, the court concluded that since Nancy's death was not im-
minent, and because the gastrostomy tube did not pose an excessive
burden of extreme pain or discomfort, her right to refuse treatment
was outweighed by Missouri's interest in protecting life.149
The court also stated that the conversations between Nancy and
her friend, in which Nancy expressed a desire never to be in a condi-
tion in which she could not take care of herself, did not represent
clear evidence of Nancy's intent to refuse medical treatment. 5 0 The
140. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 410.
141. Id. at 410 n.1.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 424-25.
144. Id. at 417.
145. Id. at 422.
146. Id. at 422-23.
147. Id. at 424.
148. Id. at 422.
149. Id. at 424.
150. Id.
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court characterized Nancy's statements as mere "informally ex-
pressed reactions" to the medical condition and treatment of an-
other.151 Thus, the court held that a guardian of an incompetent
patient could not choose, on the patient's behalf, to withdraw life sus-
taining treatment without first meeting the requirements set out in
Missouri's living will statute152 or presenting clear and convincing ev-
idence of the incompetent patient's intent.153 The court insisted that
Nancy's parents had failed to present evidence that would satisfy
either of these alternatives. 5 4
Because the court' found no clear and convincing evidence of
Nancy's desire to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and because Mis-
souri's strong state interest favored the preservation of life, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court denied the Cruzans' request to have their
daughter withdrawn from the artificial nutrition and hydration tube
that kept her alive.' 55
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court agreed to review the decision of
the Missouri Supreme Court, and thus granted the writ of certiorari
filed by the Cruzans.156 In a 5-4 vote, the Court upheld the opinion
of the Missouri Supreme Court and refused to order doctors to re-
move the gastrostomy tube from Nancy Cruzan.157
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
In deciding Cruzan, the Court framed the issue of the case nar-
rowly regarding a constitutional right to die. The Court reiterated its
belief that when confronted with "a question of such magnitude and
importance... it is the [better] part of wisdom not to attempt, by any
general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.' '158
Thus, the issue, as stated by the Court, was whether Nancy Cruzan
had a right under the United States Constitution to withdraw from
life-sustaining treatment and whether a Missouri law could require
that Nancy's parents show by clear and convincing evidence that
151. Id.
152. Missouri's living will statute expressly exempts the removal of nutrition and
hydration from a patient. See supra note 138.
153. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 426.
156. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
157. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1990).
158. Id. at 2851 (citing Town City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)).
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Nancy, if competent, would choose to withdraw from the
treatment.159
The Court began by affirming the general consensus of the state
courts that a competent patient has a right to refuse medical treat-
ment.160 This right, said the Court, stems from a "constitutionally
protected liberty interest" found in the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.161 The majority maintained that, although other
courts had found a right to refuse medical treatment under the four-
teenth amendment due process right to privacy, the right to die issue
was more appropriately evaluated as a fourteenth amendment liberty
interest. 62 The Court then assumed, "for purposes of this case," that
the constitutional liberty, interest which allows a patient to withdraw
from medical treatment also gives a patient the right to withdraw
from artificial hydration and nutrition systems.163
In upholding the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, the
Court made three specific findings with regard to Nancy Cruzan's
case. First, the Court held that in order for an incompetent to be
protected from the harm caused by a guardian's incorrect choice re-
garding whether to continue or terminate life-sustaining treatment, a
state may impose an evidentiary standard that requires the guardian
to present clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent.164
The Court maintained that the state had utilized this evidentiary
standard to emphasize the importance of making a decision regarding
medical treatment that would reflect, as accurately as possible, the
incompetent patient's desires.165 Further, the Court believed that the
imposition of the clear and convincing standard reflected society's be-
lief of "how the risk of error should be distributed between the liti-
gants."'166 Thus, the Court concluded that it would be better to err in
favor of keeping Nancy on the life support system since
an erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status
quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in med-
ical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent,
changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, at least create the potential that a
wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erro-
neous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not suscepti-
159. Id. at 2852.
160. Id. at 2846-47.
161. Id. at 2851. See also McKay v. Bergestedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (finding
that a thirty-one year old mentally competent quadriplegic had a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in withdrawing from an artificial respirator).
162. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.
163. Id. at 2852.
164. Id at 2854.
165. Id.
166. Id, (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
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ble to correction.1
6 7
Second, the Court determined that the Missouri Supreme Court
was justified in its finding that the evidence presented by Nancy's
guardians did not constitute "clear and convincing" evidence of
Nancy's desire to withdraw from the gastrostomy tube.168 The Court
recognized two interpretations as to what is meant by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The first definition requires "proof sufficient to
persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled
commitment to the termination of life supports under the circum-
stances like those presented."'169 The second definition requires evi-
dence which "produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,
evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the
fact finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue."170
At trial, Nancy's parents had presented evidence of conversations
between Nancy and her roommate in which Nancy had said that she
would never want to live in a state in which she could do nothing for
herself and was completely dependent on others.171 The Court main-
tained that the Missouri Supreme Court had not erred in finding that
these conversations did not satisfy the clear and convincing stan-
dard.172 The Court found that Nancy's statements were too general
and vague..7 3 Furthermore, although the statements addressed the
issue of the withdrawal of medical treatment, they failed to, discuss
specifically the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition.174
Finally, the Court found that the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause did not require states'to use the substituted judgment test
in determining whether life support treatment should be withdrawn
from an incompetent patient.175 The Court stated that, although the
judgment of family members may at times reflect the wishes of an
incompetent patient, "there is no automatic assurance that the view
of close family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's
167. Id
168. Id at 2855.
169. Id at 2855 n.11 (citing In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 513 N.E.2d 607, 613,
534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988)).
170. Id at 2855 n.11 (citing In re Jobes, 172 N.J. 394, 407-08, 529 A.2d 434, 441
(1987)).
171. Id. at 2846.
172. Id. at 2855.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. Id.
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would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her
situation while competent." 176 Although family members may act
entirely in good faith when they insist that a patient would not have
wanted to remain on life support, they are by no means independent
and removed from the situation. It remains a possibility that a family
member's desire to release the patient from life support when the
prognosis is irreversible will influence that family member's view of
what the patient would have wanted.177 For this reason, the Court
held that Missouri may "choose to defer only to those wishes [of the
patient that are clear and convincing], rather than confine the deci-
sion to close family members."1S
2. The Concurring Opinions of Justice O'Connor
and Justice Scalia
Justice O'Connor set out two major points in her concurring opin-
ion. First, in accord with the majority, O'Connor recognized that the
right of a competent person to refuse medical treatment originates in
the liberty interest of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.179 O'Connor, however, would take this a step further
than the majority by specifically extending the right to those patients
who seek to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration. 80 O'Connor
reasoned that "[w]hether or not the techniques used to pass food and
water into the patient's alimentary tract are termed 'medical treat-
ment,' it is clear [that like other forms of life support,] they all in-
volve some degree of intrusion and restraint."'' 1 Thus, O'Connor
concluded that forcing a competent patient to withstand such inva-
sive treatment against her will constituted a burden on the patient's
right to be free to dictate the course of his or her medical treat-
ment. 8 2 O'Connor maintained that the liberty interest of the due
176. Id. at 2856.
177. Id. at 2855-56.
178. Id.
179. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In support of her premise that mechanisms providing patients with artificial hydra-
tion and nutrition are as intrusive as other forms of life sustaining treatment,
O'Connor described the nasogastric tube that doctors sometimes use to feed patients
artificially. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The nasogastric tube is a narrow, plastic
tube which is inserted into the stomach by passing the tube into one nostril, down the
patient's esophagus and into her stomach. The physician uses a funnel at the top of
the tube to administer nutrition and hydration. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 715-16 (1989). Since a patient's natural reaction is to attempt
to remove the tube and thus relieve the discomfort it causes, patients usually must be
physically restrained by placing their hands in large mittens that are tied to the pa-
tient's bed. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Major, The
Medical Procedures for Providing Food and Water: Indications and Effects, in BY No
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process clause "must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's
deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment; including the
artificial delivery of food and water." 8 3
Second, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the majority's decision
to uphold the constitutionality of a state law requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence of an incompetent patient's desire to withdraw from
medical treatment would not necessarily act as stare decisis with re-
gard to future challenges of the same evidentiary standard. 8 4 Where
a state that has enacted a living will or durable power of attorney
statute that allows a patient to designate a proxy to make necessary
medical decisions for the patient, O'Connor maintained that the Con-
stitution may require that state to honor the proxy's decision, thus
precluding the state from requiring the proxy to show by clear and
convincing evidence that his or her decision reflects the patient's
desires.' 8 5 In support of this assertion, O'Connor pointed out that
thirteen states have living will statutes allowing a patient to choose a
proxy who will make medical decisions for the patient. 8 6
Similarly, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted
durable power of attorney statutes. 8 7 Like a living will, a durable
power of attorney allows a patient to choose a surrogate who makes
medical decisions on the patient's behalf should the patient become
incompetent. 8 8 O'Connor suggested that if a patient exercises one of
these options, and pursuant to state law chooses a surrogate, the state
EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 25
(J. Lynn ed. 1986).
O'Connor maintained that the use of both the nasogastric tube and the gastrostomy
tube, which must be surgically implanted into a patient's stomach, represent proce-
dures so intrusive that when used against a patient's will, they violate the patient's lib-
erty right to refuse medical treatment. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
183. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Stare decisia is defined as, "[To abide
by or adhere to decided cases." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979).
185. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. 1d& at 2858 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. I& at 2858 n.3 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The durable power of attorney statute in California allows a patient to indicate, by
initialing a box, the course she desires her medical treatment to take in the event that
she becomes incompetent and incapable of giving consent to medical treatment. The
patient may choose: (1) that doctors withhold all life support if the burdens of treat-
ment outweigh the benefits; (2) that doctors implement life support unless the patient
falls into an irreversible coma; or (3) that doctors prolong life even if the patient lapses
into an irreversible coma. In addition, the patient can designate an agent to make
medical decisions on the patient's behalf if she becomes incompetent. Final Choices,
supra note 7.
188. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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is obliged to recognize the decision made by the surrogate. 189 If the
state fails to do so, it would not be acting in accordance with the pa-
tient's intent. Thus, the patient's liberty interest in refusing treat-
ment would be violated.190
In contrast, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, took a differ-
ent stance with regard to the Cruzan case. Although he concurred
with Rehnquist's majority opinion, Scalia disagreed with both Rehn-
quist and O'Connor in their assertion that a person's right to refuse
treatment is guaranteed by the liberty interest as expressed by the
fourteenth amendment.191 Scalia believed that one cannot maintain
a claim of denial of a substantive right without firstshowing that the
right is one that has been "historically and traditionally protected
against State interference."' 92 Further, Justice Scalia found that any
refusal of life-sustaining treatment does not constitute a historically
or traditionally protected right.193 Rather, he equated the refusal of
medical treatment with suicide.194 Scalia noted that throughout his-
tory, the prevailing view has been that
[s]uicide was not excused [at English common law] even when committed "to
avoid those ills which [persons] had not the fortitude to endure .... The life of
those to whom life has become a burden - of those who are hopelessly dis-
eased or fatally wounded - nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to
death, are under protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who are in
the full tide of life's enjoyment and anxious to continue to live."11 9 5
Therefore, Justice Scalia believed that since suicide is not a right
that "is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamen-
tal' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered.liberty,'" it is not protected
under the due process clause.196 Justice Scalia felt that the federal
courts "have no business in this field" and that the regulation of
treatment termination cases should remain in the hands of the states
and be determined based on state statutes addressing suicide.197
Scalia supported this belief in his declaration that
the point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which the means
necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are
neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this
Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from
the Kansas City telephone directory; and hence,. . . even when it is demon-
strated by clear and convincing evidence that a patient no longer wishes cer-
tain measures to be taken to preserve her life, it is up to the citizens of
Missouri to decide, though their elected representatives, whether that wish
189. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190. 1& (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191. Id at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 2859-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Id (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163
(1873)).
196. Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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will be honored. 1 9 8 [emphasis in original]
3. The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice
Stevens
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's approval of Mis-
souri's clear and convincing standard of proving that a patient wishes
to withdraw from medical treatment.l9 9 Brennan found that Nancy
Cruzan has a "fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nu-
trition and hydration."200 Moreover, he did not believe that this right
was outweighed by Missouri's generalized interest in the preservation
of life.20 ' To Justice Brennan, the evidentiary standard implemented
by the Missouri Supreme Court represented an "improperly biased
procedural obstacleo" that "impermissibly burden[ed] [Nancy's]
right."202
In his dissent, Justice Brennan conceded that the right of a patient
to be free from medical treatment is not absolute, since the state may
have interests in continuing the treatment that outweigh the pa-
tient's right to terminate treatment.2 03 However, in this case, "no
State interest could outweigh the rights of an individual in Nancy
Cruzan's position."204 In support of this statement, Brennan main-
tained that "Missouri does not claim, nor could it, -that society as a
whole will be benefitted by Nancy's receiving medical treatment...
[nor that a] third party's situation . . . [will be] improved . . .[or]
harm to others will be averted."20 5
Finally, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for agreeing with
the method that the Missouri State Supreme Court employed to de-
termine whether or not Nancy would want to remain on life sup-
port. 206 Brennan asserted that the Missouri court's refusal to
consider Nancy's own statements and the opinions of her family
members in determining Nancy's wishes indicated that Missouri's
clear and convincing evidentiary standard could be met only by the
198. Id, at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Su-
icide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 100 (1985) (quoting Palko v. Connect-
icut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
199. Id. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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presentation of a living will or "equivalently formal directive from
the patient when competent." 20 7 In addressing this point, Brennan
argued that "too few people execute living wills or equivalently for-
mal directives for such an evidentiary rule to ensure adequately that
the wishes of incompetent persons will be honored."208 According to
Brennan, the preferred method for determining the wishes of an in-
competent patient, in the absence of express indications of the pa-
tient's desire, is to defer to the proxy appointed by the patient.2 0 9 In
the absence of such a proxy, the court should defer to the decision of
family members.210 The role of the state would be to "ensure that
the person who makes the decision on the patient's behalf is one
whom the patient himself would have selected to make that choice
for him . . . [thus,] a state generally must either repose the choice
with the person whom the patient himself would most likely have
chosen as proxy or leave the decision to the patient's family."211
Similarly, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with
Justice Brennan that Missouri had failed to present a state interest in
this case that was strong enough to outweigh Nancy's right to end
her life.212 Justice Stevens maintained that, in order to be "constitu-
tionally permissible, Missouri's intrusion upon [Nancy's] fundamental
liberties must, at a minimum, bear a reasonable relationship to a le-
gitimate state end."213 However, according to Stevens, Missouri's
proclaimed state interest in the preservation of life merely repre-
sented "an effort to define life's meaning rather than to preserve its
sanctity."214 Stevens attacked the domination of such an interest
207. Id. at 2874-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. Il at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens did not use the rational basis test to determine
if Missouri's state interests prevailed over Nancy's interest in choosing to terminate
life support. Instead, he imposed a higher standard that the state interest must meet:
whether one can reasonably infer that the state actually intends to promote its interest
in preserving life by intruding on Nancy's interest in determining her course of treat-
ment. Justice Stevens has advocated the use of this test in some instances as an alter-
native to the rational basis test, which he views as allowing too much deference to
state interests. Under the rational basis test, as long as the state infringing upon the
rights of an individual shows some state interest or purpose for doing so, the state in-
terest will prevail over the interests of the individual. See Note, Justice Stevens' Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987). See also United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Fritz,
Stevens explained that his higher standard of evaluating a state's purpose for infring-
ing on an individual's interest requires that the court establish a correlation between
the infringement and "either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose
that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature." Id. (em-
phasis added).
214. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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over Nancy's liberty interest stating, "[iut is not within the province
of secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sectar-
ian definition of life." 215
Thus, although in some cases the preservation of life may be a le-
gitimate state interest, Stevens believed "the Constitution requires
that the individual's vital interest in liberty should prevail over the
general policy" in Nancy's case. 216 Moreover, Stevens explicitly
stated that the "failure of Missouri's policy to heed the interests of a
dying individual with respect to matters so private is ample evidence
of the policy's illegitimacy." 217
Justice Stevens also addressed the issue of how the court should
evaluate the problem of whether Nancy would have desired to be
withdrawn from the gastrostomy tube. The Court, according to Ste-
vens, was correct in concluding that certain controlling facts regard-
ing a patient's desire to either remain on or withdraw from life
support must be proven with clarity before life support may be with-
drawn.2 18 This is necessary to ensure that the ultimate decision to
terminate or continue life support will reflect the patient's wishes as
accurately as possible.219
However, Stevens believed that the Court erred in focusing on the
evidentiary standard needed to prove the patient's intent.220 Instead,
Stevens maintained that the focus should be on deciding what facts
relating to the patient's desire should be controlling in the ultimate
decision to either terminate or continue life support.221 Resolving
the question of what facts should be controlling was apparently quite
simple to Stevens. He believed the court should allow the best inter-
ests of the incompetent patient to be controlling "especially when
buttressed by the interests of all related third parties."2 22 In such a
situation, these interests would always outweigh "any general state
policy that simply ignores [the best] interests [of the patient]."223
Thus, Stevens concluded that the Court should have held that "the
Constitution requires the State to care for Nancy Cruzan's life in a
215. Id at 2888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'216. I& at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. 1& (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Stevens; J., dissenting).
220. Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. I& (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. I& (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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way that gives appropriate respect to her own best interest."224 In
this situation, it would mean that the State should have allowed
Nancy to die.
IV.. THE IMPACT OF THE CRUZAN DECISION
In considering the long term impact of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cruzan, it is important to keep in mind that the Court held,
for purposes of this case only, that the Constitution allowed Missouri
to require that Nancy's parents show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that she would not have wanted doctors to continue life-sus-
taining treatment.225  I .I
In considering this limitation placed on the holding, it appears that
the Cruzan decision will not have much impact on the future of our
society. This reasoning stems from the fact that the Court may, in a
future case, decide that a state which allows a patient, pursuant to a
living will or durable power of attorney statute, to appoint a surro-
gate or proxy to make medical decisions on her behalf, but which
also requires the-proxy to show by clear and convincing evidence that
her decision reflects that of the patient, acts in violation of the pa-
tient's constitutional liberty interest.
However, despite this reasoning, it is inevitable that the Cruzan de-
cision will impact not only future right-to-die cases, but also decisions
concerning other legal issues. Furthermore, the decision is likely to
have a profound impact on both the medical community and the indi-
vidual patient.
First, the Cruzan decision is likely to impact decisions involving
legal issues that are separate from the right-to-die issue. For exam-
ple, in Griswold v. Connecticut,226 and later in Roe v. Wade,227 the
Court found that the right to contraception and a woman's right to
an abortion were guaranteed by the privacy right of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.228 However, since the majority
in Cruzan would not recognize that a right to refuse medical treat-
ment stems from a constitutional right to privacy, it has been argued
that the Court was indicating its willingness to deny that a right to
privacy exists at all in the Constitution and to "let the 'right to pri-
vacy' - announced in Griswold and applied in Roe wither away." 229
Next, in specifically addressing future right-to-die cases, one com-
mentator has suggested that the Cruzan decision may represent the
224. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
227. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
228. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
229. Taylor, In Cruzan, Justices Make the Best of a Bad Case, TEx. LAW., July 30,
1990, at S-8 [hereinafter Taylor] (citations omitted).
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first step toward the Court's upholding a state law which requires
that life-sustaining measures be continued in all situations, regardless
of the patient's desire.23o This idea is supported by the fact that,
although the due process clause protects liberty, it also protects life.
Therefore, because there is no distinction in the clause as to the qual-
ity of life it protects, it can be argued that the Constitution requires
the states to criminally prosecute anyone who contributes to the
death of another, even when that person is a doctor who refrains
from using life support to prolong the life of a patient who is termi-
nally ill.231 Therefore, it follows that if the Court so desires, it could
rule in a subsequent right-to-die case that "states not only are per-
mitted but also are required by the due process clause to sustain
some or even all incompetent patients artificially for as long as possi-
ble, regardless of the wishes of their families."2 32
On the other hand, this same commentator has argued that if the
Court had found that Nancy was denied a constitutional right to die
as a result of an unreasonably burdensome evidentiary standard, this
decision could have led to the eventual endorsement of the use of ac-
tive euthanasia in cases where a patient is confronted with the pros-
pect of a painful death.23 3 In the face of this possibility, "[e]ven many
right-to-die advocates and medical groups will shrink from active eu-
thanasia as a dangerous perversion of the medical mission."23 4
However, it is possible that the Cruzan decision, even without
striking down the Missouri law, may still have the effect of causing
states to enact legislation that allows active euthanasia. For example,
in the state of Washington, the November 1991 ballot will include Ini-
tiative 119, which would allow a physician to "aid in dying" a patient
who is terminally ill and who executes a written directive for the
physician to terminate the patient's life in a "painless and humane
manner." 23 5 The initiative would require that two physicians declare
the patient terminally ill or in an irreversible condition that will re-
230. Il
231. Id
232. 1& Euthanasia is defined as "[t]he act or practice of painlessly putting to death
persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy." BLAcK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 554 (6th ed. 1990). "Active euthanasia" is the "active administration
of a death producing agent to accelerate death." Lyon, supra note 17, at 1368.
This is distinguished from "passive euthanasia" which is defined as "the withholding
of termination of life-sustaining medical treatment to allow a disease to run its natural
course." Id Active euthanasia is illegal in all states. Taylor, supra note 229.
233. Taylor, supra note 229.
234. Id.
235. Colen, A Life and Death Debate, NEWSDAY, July 31, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter
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sult in death within six months. In addition, the request must be
made by a "conscious and medically competent qualified patient" at
the time the patient desires the "aid in dying."23 6 Further, the re-
quest must be voluntary, with no evidence of coercion. Understanda-
bly, this initiative has caused a great deal of controversy. However,
support for the initiative reportedly "snowballed in July [1990] ... af-
ter the Cruzan case." 237
In June 1990, a similar controversy and degree of media attention
surrounded the case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian who assisted a woman
with Alzheimer's disease to die through the use of a "suicide
machine." 238 In addition, the media has directed our attention to or-
ganizations like the Hemlock Society that seek to generate public
support for legislation promoting active euthanasia or, as the Society
calls it, "physician assisted suicide."239
Another problem resulting from the Cruzan decision is the fact
that the Court did not adopt a uniform standard, applicable in all
cases, for determining when medical treatment should be terminated.
Instead, the Court left this issue to the individual states to set their
own standards for deciding when an incompetent patient should
forgo medical treatment. The problems resulting from this lack of a
uniform standard are reflected in the case of Christine Busalacchi, a
twenty year old incompetent patient of the Missouri Rehabilitation
Center, where Nancy Cruzan was treated.240 Like Nancy, Christine
is in a persistent vegetative state and only her gastrostomy tube
keeps her from dying.241 Because Christine never expressed her
wishes regarding medical treatment, 2 and because the Supreme
Court affirmed Missouri's clear and convincing evidentiary standard
for determining when an incompetent could withdraw from medical
treatment, Missouri courts would be unlikely to6 grant a request for
an order to terminate Christine's treatment. Thus, her father wants
to move Christine to Minnesota where he will petition the courts for
an order compelling doctors to remove her gastrostomy tube.243 Min-
nesota law "gives doctors and family members more leeway in decid-
ing to remove treatment from patients in terminal conditions than is
Colen]; Beck, Doctor's Dilemma: How Much Care is Too Much?, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 7,
1991, at 13C.
236. Colen, supra note 231.
237. 1&
238. Id.
239. Id,
240. Chi. Tribune, Jan. 18, 1991, at 10M.
241. Christine was involved in a car accident in May 1987 in which she was seri-
ously injured. Her condition has remained the same since the accident with no sign of
improvement. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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allowed under Missouri law." 2 " However, until now, Missouri
courts, by way of a restraining order, have kept Mr. Busalacchi from
removing his daughter from Missouri.2 45
Moreover, the debate generated since the Cruzan decision reflects
the extent of the impact that Cruzan has had on a personal level. It
affects everyone faced with the possibility of being in Nancy Cruzan's
position - lying in a hospital bed in an irreversible vegetative state,
connected to life supporting machines that will not allow a natural
death. People are beginning to realize that without an executed doc-
ument stating their wishes regarding the use of life support, the judg-
ment of their families may not be enough to have the life support
withdrawn.
Although only ten percent of all Americans have executed living
wills,246 inquiries at law firms about living wills have increased dra-
matically since the Cruzan decision. At one New York City firm, in-
quiries regarding living wills rose from 20,000 per month before the
decision to over 150,000 per month after the decision. 247
However, there are problems with documents such as living wills
and durable powers of attorney. First, despite an increase in aware-
ness, a large percentage of people remain unaware that such docu-
ments exist.248 In recognition of this, there has been some effort to
inform the public of its options. For example, a doctor in Hawthorne,
California visits senior citizen centers and provides the elderly with
information about the California Durable Power of Attorney and
how it is executed.249 Similarly, a Chicago hospital has instituted a
policy of asking each patient checking into the hospital to put in writ-
ing whether or not life support treatment should be employed if the
patient should become incompetent. 25 0 One Illinois entrepreneur, in
response to the Cruzan decision, began marketing a do-it-yourself liv-
ing will kit that will be widely available in K-Marts and
Waldenbooks retail outlets.251 Further, the Cruzan decision has
prompted the federal government to enact the Patient Self-Determi-
nation Act that will help ensure that hospitals become aware of pa-
244. Missouri Court Blocks Man From Moving Brain-Damaged Daughter, United
Press Int'l, Jan. 18, 1991, BC cycle (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
245. Id.
246. Chi. Tribune, Aug. 17, 1990, at 22C.
247. Chi. Tribune, Oct. 17, 1990, at 17C.
248. Id.
249. Final Choices, supra note 7.
250. Chi. Tribune, Jan. 18, 1991, at 10M.
251. Schreiber, Ex-Printer Has Wills to Succeed, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1990, at 4.
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tients' wishes regarding medical treatment. The Act requires all
institutions receiving Medicare and Medicaid funds to give patients
information about living wills and durable powers of attorney upon
admission. Any information given by the patient that reflects wishes
regarding medical treatment must be included in her file. This provi-
sion will take effect in November 1991.252
Yet, despite these efforts to encourage the execution of living wills
and durable .powers of attorney, these documents do not always en-
sure that the patient's choice regarding life sustaining treatment will
be given effect. One obstacle may be the particular state's living will
statute. Of the thirty-nine states that recognize living wills as
valid,253 a majority do not recognize provisions for the withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration.254
In addition, there are varying requirements among the states with
regard to the point at which the directives in the living will are to be
executed. For example, states such as Wisconsin require that the mo-
ment of death be imminent before the instructions in the will may be
carried out; while other states, including California, maintain that
the directives may be employed as long as the medical treatment re-
quired will act to postpone death. Still other states, including Ala-
bama, require that death be imminent or the situation hopeless. 255
Nevertheless, there are indications that the Cruzan decision has
sparked some states to revise their legislation in an attempt to give
patients more freedom to determine the course of their medical
treatment. For example, Indiana has proposed two bills that will al-
low a patient to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, via a living
will.256 In addition, the Missouri Senate is currently considering a
bill that would allow a patient to appoint a proxy who would have
252. Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1991, at Z9.
253. Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1990, at C1.
254. Gelfand, supra note 62, at 750.
States that exempt provisions for the withdrawal of food and water include Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mis-
souri, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wiscon-
sin. Id. Indiana's living will statute also requires that food and water be provided to
comatose patients; however, two new proposed bills would revise current law and al-
low doctors to remove food and water if the patient is in a vegetative state and re-
quested in a living will that such care be terminated. So far, no hearings have been
scheduled for the proposals. Gannett News Service, Jan. 9, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis li-
brary, Omni file).
In addition, most living will statutes exempt pregnant women from executing a doc-
ument that would allow them to die while pregnant. Mahoney, Death with Dignity: Is
There an Exception for Pregnant Women?, 57 U. MO. K.C. L. REV. 221, 222 (1989).
255. Gelfand, supra note 62, at 743 (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 15.01(6) (West 1983 &
Supp. 1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(f) (West Supp. 1976); ALA. CODE
§ 22-8A-3(6) (1981)).
256. Gannett News Service, Jan. 30, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). See
supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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legal authority to make all decisions regarding medical treatment on
behalf of the patient in the event the patient becomes incompe-
tent.25 7 Similarly, former Massachusetts' governor, Michael Dukakis,
signed a health care proxy law which took effect in January 1991.258
The medical community represents another obstacle to the execu-
tion of a patient's wishes as they are stated in a living will. Often the
living will fails to be included in a patient's chart because the physi-
cian or hospital is not told that the patient has executed one.259 Fur-
thermore, if the physician knows the will exists, he or she may be
hesitant to act on it because "its usefulness [may have been] limited
by vague terms, such as 'heroic measures' or 'life-prolonging proce-
dures.' "260 Unfortunately, these terms do not specifically indicate
the types of life-sustaining treatment the patient wishes to avoid. Fi-
nally, a physician may decide to ignore a directive made by the pa-
tient because the doctor opposes the action, viewing it as killing the
patient or, perhaps, fearing a malpractice suit because all available
life-sustaining options were not exhausted. Thus, physicians, "in an
age when medical lawsuits abound, sometimes supersede advance di-
rectives in favor of the legally safer path of 'doing everything' for
their patients."261 In the opinion of some, "the Cruzan decision is
having . . . [the] horrible effect of physicians starting to practice
1aw."262
Conversely, a hospital or physician may decide that a patient
should be removed from life-sustaining treatment despite the desire
of the patient's family for her to remain on life support. This is the
scenario of the current controversy in Minnesota where a hospital is
seeking a court order to withdraw life support from Helga Wanglie,
an elderly patient in a persistent vegetative state.2 63 The hospital
claims that the removal of Mrs. Wanglie's resuscitator and gastros-
257. Chi. Tribune, Jan. 23, 1991, at 14C.
Joe Cruzan, Nancy's father, ranks among the supporters of this legislation. He testi-
fied twice before a legislative committee and stated that family members will comprise
most of the people forced to make life or death choices. Id.
258. Boston Globe, Jan. 2, 1991, at 41P. Any Massachusetts citizen over eighteen
may designate a health care agent by signing a health care proxy form. In addition,
two witnesses must sign the form. Id.
259. Chi. Tribune, Jan. 18, 1991, at 10M.
260. I&
261. Id.
262. Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1990, at Z7.
263. Colen, Fight Over Life, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 63 (Nassau ed.) This hospi-
tal argued that it is not "obligated to provide inappropriate medical treatment which
cannot advance a patient's personal interests." Id. Thus, the hospital maintained that
in Mrs. Wanglie's case, "someone had to take a stand to say, 'Enough!'" Id.
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tomy tube is in her best interests, despite her family's insistence that
Mrs. Wanglie, if competent, would wish to remain on the life
support. 264
Therefore, with the treatment termination problems presented by
today's medical technology, it is necessary that the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient return to the way it was before this tech-
nology was developed. Today, it is typical that a patient will have
many different doctors and specialists attending to her condition. As
a result, a strong doctor-patient bond is less likely to develop since
each of these doctors concentrates only on a segment of the patient's
condition. However, in order for a doctor to fully understand the pa-
tient's desires and attitudes toward life-sustaining treatment, it is im-
perative that the doctor become familiar with more than just a
patient's physical condition. The doctor must also get to know the
patient's value system and personal world view. Thus, the physician,
"no matter how specialized his or her training, will have to become a
more holistic healer, attentive not only to the specific body part in
question but to the total quality of life."265
V. CONCLUSION
Until her death on December 26, 1990, Nancy Cruzan remained in
a Mount Vernon, Missouri hospital with her gastrostomy tube in
place to prolong her death. Public funds paid for the expense of her
treatment, estimated to total $130,000 per year.2 66 However, despite
the Supreme Court decision, Nancy's family refused to give up. Mr.
and Mrs. Cruzan went back into Jasper County Court in August 1990
and filed another petition to have the life support withdrawn. At the
hearing, they presented the testimony of three new witnesses who
related their serious conversations with Nancy in which Nancy stated
that she would never want to live in a vegetative state.267 The court
determined that this new evidence sufficiently satisfied the state's
clear and convincing evidentiary standard necessary to allow doctors
to remove Nancy's gastrostomy tube.26 8
Other factors contributing to the Cruzans' successful petition in-
cluded the fact that the presiding judge was the same judge who ini-
264. Id, The Wanglie family based its contention on conversations between Mrs.
Wanglie and her daughter in which Mrs. Wanglie stated that she "wouldn't want her
life prematurely shortened if she wasn't able to care for herself." Id, In addition, Mr.
Wanglie argued that after fifty years of marriage, he knows what her values are and is
in the best position to make a decision on her behalf regarding medical treatment. He
maintained that both he and Mrs. Wanglie "take the position that human life is sa-
cred." Id
265. Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1990, at Z6.
266. Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1990, at Z7.
267. Id.
268. Chi. Tribune, Jan. 23, 1991, at 14C.
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tially granted the Cruzans' request to withdraw Nancy from life
support in 1987.269 In addition, in September 1990, the court granted
a request by the State of Missouri, the Missouri Health Department
and the director of the rehabilitation center where Nancy was being
treated to withdraw from the case.270 According to the Missouri At-
torney General, the State concluded that with the Supreme Court's
ruling on the case in June, Missouri had no interest in the new pro-
ceeding.271 Hence, the Cruzans faced only the guardian ad litem in
court who, throughout all of the proceedings, remained sympathetic
to Nancy's family and believed that it was in Nancy's best interests to
be removed from the gastrostomy tube.2 7 2
Thus, after eight years of living in a vegetative state, Nancy was fi-
nally allowed to die.273 However, many other patients in a similar
condition continue to exist on life support machines, unable to with-
draw from them and die with dignity. Society must strive to develop
policies to deal responsibly with modern medical technology and to
safeguard that its use will not continue to be abused.
MARY A. WATSON
269. Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1990, at Z7.
270. I&
271. 1L The press has speculated that the underlying motivation for Missouri's
withdrawal from the Cruzan case lies in the fact that the people of Missouri support
Nancy's family in their desire to have Nancy removed from life support. Moreover,
the Missouri Attorney General, William L. Webster, is rumored to be entering the race
for governor of Missouri in 1992. 1&
272. Nancy's guardian ad litem also submitted a brief to the United States Supreme
Court prior to its decision in June, recommending that the Supreme Court reverse the
Missouri State Supreme Court's decision. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2841, 2853 n.9 (1990).
Additionally, the ACLU argued in an amicus brief that "the decision to forgo life-
sustaining treatment is an American liberty, guaranteed by constitutional rights." L.A.
Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at El, col. 2.
273. A public outcry arose when doctors finally removed Nancy's gastrostomy tube.
The group that was the most active in protesting the court order was Operation Res-
cue, an anti-abortion organization. Operation Rescue members attempted to gain en.
trance to Nancy's hospital room in order to reconnect the gastrostomy tube or feed her
manually, despite Nancy's inability to swallow. L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at El, col. 2.
In addition, approximately 100 members of the group camped outside of the Missouri
Rehabilitation Center for the final days of Nancy's life. A number of Operation Res-
cue members also filed petitions in the Missouri courts in an attempt to obtain an or-
der to reconnect Nancy's tube. These petitions were all denied. Id.
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